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1 Introduction
International trade in intermediate goods has become increasingly important worldwide, accounting
for about a third of the increase in global trade flows in recent years (Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001).
Yet trade in intermediate goods is not only quantitatively important; it is also qualitatively diﬀerent
from trade in final goods, since it often involves tailor-made components that command a lower value
from parties not involved in the transaction. If contracts are incomplete, this tends to discourage
relationship-specific investments, leading to underinvestment due to the fear of future "hold-ups."
In this setting, we study the implications of protection for investment, organizational structure, and
welfare, and ask the following questions: Is protection necessarily bad? Can protection aﬀect the
social desirability of domestic vs. oﬀshore supply of inputs and of arm’s-length trading vs. vertical
integration? And does protection distort the eﬃciency of equilibrium organizational forms?
We show that a tariﬀ can improve social welfare through mitigating hold-up problems. By in-
creasing the cost of substitute generic foreign inputs, tariﬀs motivate domestic specialized suppliers
to increase investments in technology improvements. Essentially, the tariﬀ improves the supplier’s
bargaining position by lowering the value of the downstream buyer’s option to purchase generic
inputs. Since under free trade a domestic specialized supplier would underinvest due to the hold-up
problem, a tariﬀ that is not too high (i.e., does not generate excessive deadweight losses by artifi-
cially inflating the price of substitutes) improves welfare. By contrast, protection does not promote
investment by foreign specialized suppliers, because it does not discriminate in their favor. Since
a tariﬀ aﬀects the price of generic substitutes in the same way, it does not improve the foreign
supplier’s bargaining position.
Tariﬀs also create welfare-reducing organizational externalities. Because firms do not capture
tariﬀ revenue, protection drives a wedge between the private and social gains of using a domestic
specialized supplier and of vertically integrating. Since the tariﬀ discriminates in favor of domestic
suppliers, buyers (ignoring the country’s lost tariﬀ revenue) will choose to deal with such suppliers
even in some cases where a foreign supplier would be more productive. Furthermore, since weaker
hold-up problems under vertical integration induce an upstream buyer to use fewer generic imports
when integrated than it does when trading at arm’s length, buyers will choose to vertically integrate
even in cases where the cost of integration is too high relative to its (social) benefits through reducing
hold-up problems.
Overall, our findings suggest that the eﬀects of tariﬀs on welfare are far more nuanced than
normally believed. First, organizational forms are (conditionally) socially eﬃcient under free trade
but free trade may not maximize welfare. Indeed, if we observe domestic outsourcing under free
trade, some protection would be socially desirable. Second, observing oﬀshoring under a very pro-
tectionist regime would provide evidence that the economy would benefit from free trade. Third,
since policy discrimination is key for attenuating hold up problems, under the World Trade Or-
ganization principle of National Treatment,1 domestic taxation, unlike import tariﬀs, would not
1Namely, that “imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally after the foreign goods have entered
the market” (http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm).
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aﬀect investment incentives. This highlights a rather rare circumstance where trade taxes dominate
domestic taxation.2 Fourth, there is a qualitative diﬀerence between the eﬀects of tariﬀs and of
unrecoverable trade costs on organizational form. While the latter generally aﬀect organizational
choices (see e.g. Antràs and Helpman 2004), they do not distort supply or ownership decisions
away from social optima. In contrast, our model predicts that countries with high tariﬀs tend to
have too much domestic sourcing and too many integrated firms, relative to the socially optimal.
To make our points as clearly as possible, we design our model so that all standard motivations
for active trade policy are shut down. Additionally, we restrict attention to dual sourcing of inputs:
the downstream buyer purchases both customized inputs from a (foreign or domestic) specialized
supplier and generic inputs from a foreign competitive fringe. Dual, or "second," sourcing has been
common practice for decades in several industries.3 However, our emphasis on dual sourcing is
mainly pedagogical, as it generates the simplest environment in which a tariﬀ always aﬀects the
buyer’s costs from at least one source of supply and to which we can easily add endogenous orga-
nizational form. This assumption allows us to present our results sharply, avoiding a cumbersome
taxonomy. It also sacrifices surprisingly little generality. The qualitative results from our model
carry over, for example, into an environment where only one source of supply is ultimately chosen
but there is ex ante uncertainty about which supplier will have the lowest price, i.e. where two
sources "expect" to produce inputs with some probability.4
Our work is directly related to the burgeoning literature using models of incomplete contracts
to study optimal sourcing decisions and organizational form in an international context.5 It con-
tributes also to the law-and-economics and industrial organization literatures that seek to identify
contractual and institutional "solutions" to the hold-up problem. These solutions usually require
either a commitment to not renegotiate contracts or the ability of courts to punish contract breach.6
If renegotiation cannot be prevented and courts cannot always enforce contracts, the standard un-
derinvestment problem remains. We show that import tariﬀs can, sometimes, be useful in that
context.7
But our most direct contribution is to the trade policy literature. First, we identify, and
qualify, a novel circumstance where protection can enhance welfare–mitigating hold-up problems.
2As is well known, for most other reasons that could justify policy intervention, there are usually other "less
ineﬃcient" domestic instruments available (Rodrik 1995).
3Two prominent examples are defense contracting (Lyon 2006) and semiconductors (Shepard 1987; Farrell and
Gallini 1988). Researchers have argued that dual sourcing may help to prevent bottlenecks, to induce competition
among oligopolistic suppliers, and to achieve commitment from buyers. We abstract from commitment issues and
strategic competition among suppliers by modeling the second source as a purely competitive "fringe."
4 In previous work (Ornelas and Turner 2008), we use a "single source under uncertainty" model to show that
tariﬀs have multiple potential eﬀects on trade flows under contractual incompleteness.
5See for example McLaren (1999, 2000), Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008), Grossman and Helpman (2005), and
Ornelas and Turner (2008).
6For example, Rogerson (1992) shows that the hold-up problem may be solved with properly specified initial
contracts as long as it is possible to prohibit renegotiation, whereas Spier and Whinston (1995) and Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996) show that well-tuned fixed-price contracts may solve the investment problem depending on the
breach remedy enforced by courts.
7 In a closed economy, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) show that government intervention, though domestic tax-
ation, may solve hold-up problems caused by bilateral spillovers of one-sided investments.
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Second, and in contrast, we uncover a new channel through which protection promotes ineﬃciency–
distorting organizational choices.
The independent work by Antràs and Staiger (2008) relates to our first point. They build
on the modeling framework developed by Antràs and Helpman (2004) to identify a new role for
international trade agreements in correcting international hold-up problems and preventing inef-
ficient manipulation of unilateral trade policies aimed at aﬀecting bargaining over supply prices.
To highlight their main points, Antràs and Staiger focus on a single source of supply and treat
organizational form as exogenous (all upstream firms outsource abroad). In contrast, we design our
model to explicitly eliminate the need for trade agreements. This allows us to isolate the diﬀerential
eﬀects of tariﬀs depending on the location of specialized suppliers and the ownership structure, as
well as their role in defining those organizational choices, from confounding forces that arise when
governments set trade policies actively. But as we discuss in the conclusion, expanding our setting
to consider the role of trade agreements presents itself as a natural, and potentially very interesting,
extension.
In turn, the recent paper by Conconi, Legros and Newman (2008) relates to our second point
that international trade can aﬀect the eﬃciency of organizational choices. Their environment,
reasoning and predictions are entirely diﬀerent from ours, however. In their setting, ineﬃcient
organizations arise because managers care about the private costs of their actions, and this leads to
insuﬃcient coordination between related firms. By aﬀecting coordination incentives, international
trade may induce either socially ineﬃcient integration or socially ineﬃcient disintegration.
After describing the model, we study the eﬀect of specific tariﬀs on investment decisions under
each possible organizational form (section 2). In section 3 we compare the welfare impact of pro-
tectionist policies under each type of organization, taken as given. In section 4 we then analyze the
welfare implications of protectionist policies taking into account also their eﬀects on organizational
forms. In section 5 we extend the analysis to the case of ad valorem tariﬀs. We conclude in section
6.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Structure
There are two final goods. A numéraire good x is traded freely and enters in the objective function
of (identical) consumers linearly; consumption of a diﬀerentiated good y increases the utility of
consumers at a decreasing rate. Thus, if consumers purchase any amount of x, any extra income is
directed to the consumption of that good. We assume the price of good y is such that consumers
purchase both goods.
Production of one unit of good x requires one unit of labor, and the market for good x is
perfectly competitive. This eﬀectively sets the wage rate in the economy to unity whenever good
x is produced. Production of y requires transforming an intermediate input under conditions of
decreasing returns to scale. There is a single producer of good y in the Home economy, but he
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has no market power because the price of y is determined in the world market, which the Home
producer cannot influence.
At the current price of good y, the Home producer–whom we call the buyer, B–obtains
revenue V (Q) when he purchases Q units of inputs, with V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0. Trade taxes and
subsidies shift B’s demand for inputs, V 0(Q), but do nothing else. Since we are concerned with the
eﬀects of protection in the market for inputs, we assume hereafter that any trade taxes/subsidies
in the market of good y are already factored in V and do not change throughout the analysis. It
is immaterial for the analysis whether Home is an importer or an exporter of good y.
The buyer has two sourcing options. He can purchase customized inputs from a specialized
supplier at a price they negotiate. This supplier, which we denote by Sj , could be either domestic
(j = d) or foreign (j = f). Alternatively, B can purchase standardized inputs in the world market
at price pw. In that case, the buyer also has to incur a (specific) tariﬀ t, so the cost of each imported
unit of a generic input for him is pw + t.8 Since these generic inputs may require adaptation costs,
they will in general have a lower value for B than the specialized inputs. We normalize units to take
these diﬀerences into account, so that the buyer becomes indiﬀerent between one unit of generic
input and one unit of customized input. To ensure that B always buys at least some inputs under
free trade, we assume V 0(0) > pw.
To use specialized inputs, the buyer has to adapt his technology toward the inputs of either
Sd or Sf . If B adapts toward Sj , the inputs of Si, i 6= j, become worthless to him. The inputs
of Sj have the same value to B regardless of the identity of j, conditional on B adapting toward
Sj . The cost of the adaptation, which is independent of the supplier, is normalized to zero. Before
specializing, B makes a take-it-or-leave-it request for a transfer from the chosen supplier. This
allows the buyer to capture all surplus from the supplier. This assumption, made for convenience,
shuts down any revenue-stealing implications of tariﬀs. Without it, the analysis would be identical
if we focused instead on world ’s welfare to define eﬃcient choices.9
Production of inputs requires labor. In labor units, Sj ’s cost of producing specialized inputs is
Cj(q, i), where q denotes the quantity produced and i ∈ [0, i] represents a cost-reducing investment
carried out by Sj in anticipation of future trade. If Sj does not produce specialized inputs, she
produces the numéraire good and earns a payoﬀ of zero. Function Cj satisfies Cjq > 0, Cji < 0
and Cjqi < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Furthermore, C
j
q (0, 0) < pw and C
j
qq > 0,
so Sj has a cost advantage relative to the world market at low levels of q, but her technology’s
marginal costs increases with q. The supplier’s investment costs I(i) labor units, with I(0) = 0,
I 0(0) = 0, I 0 > 0 for i > 0 and I 00 > 0. Thus, Sj ’s total cost function is Γj(q, i) ≡ Cj(q, i) + I(i).
To ensure the second-order necessary condition for Sj ’s investment choice is satisfied, we assume
Γj(q, i) is convex in q and i.
If firms B and Sj trade at arm’s length, Sj chooses her investment according to the impact of
i on Sj ’s own expected profit. If B and Sj vertically integrate, we follow Hart and Tirole (1990)
8 In subsection 5 we consider the case of ad valorem tariﬀs.
9See also the discussion in footnote 11.
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Figure 1: Organizational Form
in assuming that they choose investment to maximize total profit. On the other hand, the firms
incur higher governance costs under vertical integration, which we model as a fixed cost of K > 0
labor units. To facilitate exposition, we say firm B makes all decisions under integration, bearing
all costs and receiving all profits. Figure 1 shows the four possible organizational forms, along with
terminology we use to describe them.
Whenever we observe dual sourcing, where B buys both specialized inputs from Sj and stan-
dardized inputs from the rest of the world, B’s total demand for inputs, Q∗, equalizes the marginal
gain and the marginal cost from acquiring an extra input from Sj :
V 0(Q∗) = pw + t. (1)
Dual sourcing is eﬃcient when the tariﬀ is suﬃciently low, relative to the marginal cost of Sj .
To highlight how import tariﬀs aﬀect organizational form and welfare, and to avoid an extensive
taxonomy, we restrict the analysis to such cases. Assumption A1 is a suﬃcient condition for this:
A1 : t < min
n
td, tf
o
,
where tj is the tariﬀ that (just) forecloses trade of generic inputs when i = i and the specialized
supplier is Sj . These tariﬀs are defined implicitly by
Cdq (Q
∗(td), i) ≡ pw + td and
Cfq (Q
∗(tf ), i) ≡ pw.
5
Hence, for any t < td and i ∈ [0, i], Cdq (Q∗(t), i) > pw + t, and it is eﬃcient to import some generic
inputs when B chooses Sd. Similarly, for any t < tf and i ∈ [0, i], Cfq (Q∗(t), i) > pw, and it is
eﬃcient to purchase some generic inputs when B chooses Sf .
Having B’s total demand for inputs pinned down by pw + t according to (1) leaves only one
element of sourcing to be determined, namely how B chooses the mix of generic and customized
inputs in each case. This oﬀers the advantage of simplifying the analysis while not surrendering too
much generality. If, for example, pw were uncertain for the firms before the investment decision,
our main insights would carry through even if we imposed single sourcing ex post, provided that
the firms anticipated positive probabilities of generic and customized sourcing.
Absent integration, the parties cannot use contracts to ensure eﬃcient decisions. Thus, as is
standard in the incomplete contracts literature, investment is observed by both B and Sj , but is
not verifiable by an outside observer such as a court; hence, it is non-contractible. Furthermore, B
and Sj cannot use contracts to aﬀect their trade decision.10
The timing of the game we analyze is as follows. The tariﬀ is given exogenously. In the first
period, firm B chooses organizational form, i.e. between the domestic and the foreign specialized
supplier, and between outsourcing and vertical integrating. Upon the choice of supplier, firm B
specializes toward her. Under integration, B pays the fixed cost of integration K and chooses the
level of the relationship-specific investment of the supplier and the volume of specialized inputs to
produce. Under outsourcing, B requests a transfer from the specialized supplier, who keeps control
of her assets and chooses her relationship-specific investment. After investment has been sunk, the
buyer and the specialized supplier bargain over price and quantity of customized inputs. In all
types of organizations, B buys generic inputs on the world market while trading customized inputs
with the specialized supplier.
We analyze this problem recursively. First, we take investment and the identity of the specialized
supplier as given and study production and sourcing decisions conditional on investment. We return
to the choice of investment later in this section, and study the choice of organization form in section
4.
2.2 Sourcing
Consider first the case where B has adapted toward the domestic supplier, Sd. Privately eﬃcient
sourcing requires that he purchase qd units from Sd, where qd satisfies
Cdq (q
d, i) = pw + t. (2)
Hence, Sd produces up to the point where her marginal cost of production equalizes the world
price, inclusive of the tariﬀ (notice that, under A1, qd < Q∗).
10This would be the case, for example, if Sj could produce either high-quality or low-quality specialized inputs,
with low-quality inputs entailing a negligible production cost for the seller but being useless to the buyer. Similar
assumptions have been used by several authors studying the impact of incomplete contracts on international trade–
e.g. Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antràs (2003), Antràs and Staiger (2008).
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Consider now the case where B is specialized toward the foreign supplier, Sf . We assume the
Home country is a member of the World Trade Organization and has to abide by the principle
of non-discrimination across diﬀerent sources of imports. Thus, any tariﬀ the Home government
applies has the same eﬀect on the cost of specialized and standardized inputs. Privately eﬃcient
sourcing, which is also socially eﬃcient in this case, requires that
Cfq (q
f , i) = pw, (3)
where qf denotes the quantity of specialized inputs purchased from Sf . Since in this case B has no
domestic sourcing option, he must pay the tariﬀ on all Q∗ units regardless of how many specialized
inputs he purchases. Thus, B and Sf trade up to the point where Sf ’s marginal cost of production
equalizes the world price, not including the tariﬀ.
2.3 First-best Investment
Before studying investment decisions, we calculate the first-best level of investment–conditional
on the tariﬀ–a benchmark for the analysis of equilibrium investment under each organizational
form.
We first define total profit, U j , as the sum of B’s and Sj ’s payoﬀs. When Sd is chosen, total
profit is given by
Ud(i, t) = V (Q∗)− (pw + t)(Q∗ − qd)− Cd(qd, i)− I(i). (4)
When Sf is chosen, total profit is defined instead by
Uf (i, t) = V (Q∗)− (pw + t)(Q∗ − qf )− tqf − Cf (qf , i)− I(i). (5)
Besides the potentially distinct cost functions, the diﬀerence between the two expressions is that
specialized inputs incur in the tariﬀ only if Sf is the specialized supplier.
We next define national surplus. Notice first that labor income is fixed, given by the population
size times the unit wage rate, which is the price of the numéraire good. Since the price of final
good y is fixed throughout the analysis, changes in income aﬀect only the consumption of the
numéraire good, which enters linearly in the utility function of consumers. Changes in national
surplus/welfare are therefore equivalent to changes in national income. Assuming tariﬀ revenue
is rebated back to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, national surplus (omitting constant terms)
is W j(i, t) = U j(i, t) + tM j(t), where M j(t) represents B’s imports of inputs when supplier Sj is
chosen. The diﬀerence between U j and W j is that the latter concept recognizes that the tariﬀ
duties paid by B do not constitute a social loss.11
11Notice that, given our assumptions that the buyer has full ownership and control of the integrated firm, and that
under arm’s length he can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the supplier before specializing toward her, the buyer
absorbs the total profit generated in this sector under all organizational forms. Accordingly, Home’s national welfare
always incorporates B-Sj ’s total profit U j . Those assumptions are not critical for our results, however. Without
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Using (4), we rewrite national surplus under domestic specialized supply as
W d(i, t) = V (Q∗)− pw(Q∗ − qd)−Cd(qd, i)− I(i). (6)
The first-best level of investment maximizes (6) conditional on the tariﬀ. When tariﬀs are positive,
the following condition guarantees a unique, interior first-best investment:
A2 : Cjiq is constant.
Under A2, a marginal increase in investment brings the marginal cost curve down, but does not
aﬀect its slope or curvature. Taking the first-order condition for (6) with respect to i and using
condition (2) for privately optimal sourcing, we obtain an expression defining the first-best level of
investment, idfb:
−Cdi (qd, idfb) = I 0(idfb) + t
dqd
di
. (7)
A marginal increase in investment lowers the cost of production by Cdi .
12 On the other hand, the
extra investment costs I 0, and the increase in investment raises domestic production at the expense
of imports. This has no social cost in the absence of tariﬀs. But if t > 0, society saves pw on the
marginal imported unit to spend Cdq producing an extra unit. Since Cdq > pw when t > 0, this is
ineﬃcient, implying a lower socially-optimal level of investment.
If B adapts instead toward Sf , the expression for national surplus, W f (i, t), is analogous to
equation (6), but replaces qd with qf and C(.) with Cf (.). Using condition (3) for privately optimal
sourcing, we find that the first-best level of investment in this case, iffb, satisfies
−Cfi (qf , i
f
fb) = I
0(iffb). (8)
The convexity of Γf ensures that iffb corresponds to a maximum. Since the tariﬀ does not distort
sourcing decisions when the specialized supplier is abroad, it has no impact on iffb.
2.4 Investment and Protection
To study equilibrium choices of investment, we consider each organizational form in turn. We look
first at the cases where B and Sj operate at arm’s length; we then move to the case where they are
vertically integrated. When pertinent, we add subscript k ∈ {a, v} to qj , ij and M j to distinguish
between equilibria under arm’s-length (a) and vertically integrated (v) relationships.
them, we could define global welfare and carry out precisely the same analysis.
12Under A2, the second-order necessary condition associated with idfb being a maximum of (6) is satisfied, as it
corresponds to SONCdfb ≡
?
Cdiq
?2
/
?
Cdqq − Cdii − I 00
?
< 0, where the negative sign follows from the convexity of Γd.
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2.4.1 Domestic Outsourcing
Under arm’s-length trading, firm B cannot commit, ex ante, to purchase any quantity of standard-
ized or specialized inputs. As a result, the two parties have to bargain ex post over their terms of
trade. Since at that point Sd’s investment is sunk, this allows B to "hold up" Sd by negotiating
a price that takes advantage of the lower production cost due to Sd’s investment, but without
compensating Sd for the cost of her investment.
The quantity and price at which B and Sd trade are therefore determined by a bargain between
the two parties in light of Sd’s post-investment cost structure. If bargaining is successful, the
parties implement the eﬃcient sourcing decision described by (1) and (2), trading qd units between
themselves while B purchases the remaining Q∗ − qd units from abroad. The bargaining price pd
divides the surplus generated by Sd selling qd units to B (instead of B importing all Q∗ units)
according to exogenous bargaining power. We assume the generalized Nash bargaining solution
applies, with α and 1− α denoting Sd’s and B’s bargaining powers, respectively, where α ∈ [0, 1].
If B does not buy any specialized input from Sd, Sd obtains a payoﬀ of zero. Thus, if negotiation
breaks down, ex post payoﬀs are (
u0b = V (Q
∗)− (pw + t)Q∗
u0s = 0
for B and Sd, respectively. By contrast, if the two parties agree in their negotiation, ex post payoﬀs
are (
u1db = V (Q
∗)− (pw + t)(Q∗ − qd)− pdqd
u1ds = pdqd − Cd(qd, i).
(9)
Thus, B’s gain from negotiating is his savings from purchasing qd units of inputs at a price lower
than the world price, inclusive of the tariﬀ: u1db − u0b = qd(pw + t − pd). For Sd, the net gain is
simply her profit from the transaction: u1ds −u0s = pdqd−Cd(qd, i). Total negotiation surplus (NSd)
is therefore
NSd ≡ (u1db − u0b) + (u1ds − u0s)
= (pw + t)qd − Cd(qd, i). (10)
According to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, the parties’ negotiated price epd satisfies
epd = arg max
p
(u1db − u0b)1−α(u1ds − u0s)α. (11)
It is straightforward to find that
epd = (1− α)C(qd, i)/qd + α(pw + t). (12)
Thus, epd is a weighted average of Sd’s average cost of production and of the imported input unit
9
cost, with a higher α implying that Sd absorbs a greater share of the saving costs from her ex
ante cost-reducing investment. As the domestic supplier anticipates the outcome of the bargaining
process, her ex ante payoﬀ is given by
uds(i, t) = α
h
(pw + t)qd − Cd(qd, i)
i
− I(i). (13)
Or equivalently, Sd anticipates receiving a share α of the negotiation surplus NSd while bearing
the full cost of the investment.13
The domestic supplier chooses investment to maximize (13). Using equation (2), her choice of
investment, ida, satisfies
−αCdi (qda, ida) = I 0(ida), (14)
where qda(t) ≡ qd(ida(t), t) is the resulting number of inputs produced by Sd when she invests
according to (14). The left-hand side of (14) denotes the fraction of the reduction in the cost of
production induced by a marginal increase in i that is absorbed by Sd, whereas the right-hand side
represents the cost of this extra unit of investment.14
Expression (14) is familiar from studies of the hold-up problem. If α = 0, the hold-up problem is
extreme and Sd does not have any incentive to invest. As α rises, the level of investment increases.
A direct comparison between idfb and i
d
a makes clear that, under free trade, the seller underinvests
relative to the socially optimal level whenever α < 1.
Under import protection (t > 0), however, Sd’s investment can be either too little or too
large, relative to the first best. While weak protection of supplier’s investment (α < 1) induces
underinvestment, import protection fosters over investment, because when investing the seller does
not internalize the social ineﬃciency from the displacement of imports caused by the subsequent
increase in domestic production. The next proposition proves these points. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 If α = 0, ida = 0. If α > 0, ida > 0 and is strictly increasing in α and in the tariﬀ.
Moreover, ida(td) < idfb(t
d) if and only if α < 1 and the tariﬀ is suﬃciently low.
The possibility of hold up implies that the marginal benefit of Sd’s investment is dampened under
free trade whenever she has less-than-full bargaining power in the negotiation with B. However,
Proposition 1 shows that, for α ∈ (0, 1), a tariﬀ could solve the hold-up problem, potentially raising
investment to its first-best level, given the tariﬀ. This is possible because the tariﬀ increases the
negotiation surplus (10) by worsening B’s outside option. Since Sd’s outside option is unaﬀected
by the tariﬀ, the higher NSd unambiguously raises her incentive to invest, attenuating the hold-up
problem unless it is insoluble–i.e., unless α = 0, in which case Sd obtains none of NSd. On the
13This equivalence does not hold when the tariﬀ is ad valorem and the specialized supplier is foreign, as we explain
in section 5.
14The second derivative of (13) with respect to i is SONCd ≡ α
?
(Cdiq)
2
Cdqq
− Cdii
?
− I 00. The convexity of Γd ensures
that SONCd < 0, so that ida denotes indeed a maximum of (13).
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Figure 2: The Eﬀects of a Tariﬀ under Domestic Outsourcing
other hand, a tariﬀ can also induce too much incentive for investment: if the tariﬀ is suﬃciently
high, the seller invests more than is socially optimal. This is most easily seen by noting that, for
α = 1, any positive tariﬀ induces investment that exceeds the first-best.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀects of the tariﬀ when α > 0. It shows the supplier’s marginal cost
curve and optimal sourcing decisions under free trade and under a strictly positive tariﬀ. Under
free trade, the negotiation surplus is given by area a, between the horizontal line that represents pw
and the marginal cost curve Cdq (q, ida(0)). The optimal number of specialized inputs sold is qda(0).
Any further investment would push the Cdq curve down, increasing NSd, but would also be costly
for the supplier. The supplier’s choice of investment, ida, is such that α times the increase in NSd
brought about by a marginal increase in investment equals the cost of the additional investment.
Once a tariﬀ is introduced, generic imported inputs become more expensive, worsening the
outside option of the buyer. Then, at the initial level of investment, NSd increases to include
area b–hypothetically, Sd would produce qd(ida(0), t) inputs if it were to continue to invest ida(0).
However, Sd’s marginal gain from increasing investment also jumps–unlike the investment cost,
which is unrelated to the tariﬀ. As a result, the supplier increases her investment until the point
where her marginal gain and the marginal cost of investment are equalized again, ida(t). At that
level of investment, Sd produces qda(t).
2.4.2 Foreign Outsourcing
The analysis is similar for arm’s-length trading when Sf is chosen. At the bargaining stage between
B and Sf , if bargaining breaks down, ex post payoﬀs are just as they were for B and Sd under
11
domestic outsourcing. By contrast, if the two parties agree in their negotiation, ex post payoﬀs are(
u1fb = V (Q
∗)− (pw + t)Q∗ + (pw − pf )qf
u1fs = pfqf − Cf (qf , i),
(15)
where pf is the price reached under Nash bargaining. Thus, B’s net gain from negotiating is his
savings from purchasing qf units of inputs at a price pf , i.e. u1fb − u0b = qf (pw − pf ). For Sf , the
net gain is her profit from the transaction: u1fs − u0s = pfqf − Cf (qf , i). Total negotiation surplus
(NSf ) is therefore
NSf = pwqf −Cf (qf , i). (16)
Since Sf anticipates getting a fraction α of the negotiation surplus, her ex ante payoﬀ is
ufs (i, t) = α
h
pwqf − Cf (qf , i)
i
− I(i). (17)
The foreign supplier chooses investment to maximize this expression. Thus, Sf ’s choice of invest-
ment, ifa, is characterized by
−αCfi (qfa , ifa) = I 0(ifa), (18)
where qfa ≡ qf (ifa) is the resulting number of inputs produced by Sd when she invests according to
(18).15
Equation (18) has the same interpretation of equation (14). However, ifa is unaﬀected by the
tariﬀ. The reason is that, when the specialized supplier is abroad, a tariﬀ has the same eﬀect on
B’s payoﬀ regardless of the success of the bargaining between the two parties. As a result, the
negotiation surplus is not aﬀected by the tariﬀ, and neither is Sf ’s payoﬀ, implying that in this
case a tariﬀ is incapable of promoting investment.
Proposition 2 If α = 0, ifa = 0. If α > 0, i
f
a > 0 and is strictly increasing in α, with i
f
a < i
f
fb
unless α = 1. However, ifa is unaﬀected by the tariﬀ.
Figure 3 shows, for a fixed supplier’s investment, the eﬀective marginal cost curves under free
trade (t = 0) and a positive tariﬀ t > 0. Because the tariﬀ aﬀects the cost of purchasing specialized
inputs from Sf in the same way it aﬀects the cost of purchasing standardized inputs in the world
market, it does not aﬀect B-Sf ’s negotiation surplus: area a is identical in size to area b. Hence,
the tariﬀ does not aﬀect investment incentives.
2.4.3 Vertical Integration
Suppose now that B and Sj have vertically integrated prior to Sj ’s investment. Investment is then
chosen to maximize total profit, defined in expression (4) if j = d and in expression (5) if j = f .
15The second derivative of (17) with respect to i is SONCf ≡ α
??
Cfiq
?2
Cfqq
− Cfii
?
− I00. The convexity of Γf ensures
that SONCf < 0, so that ifa denotes indeed a maximum of (17).
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Figure 3: The Eﬀects of a Tariﬀ under Foreign Outsourcing
In both cases, equilibrium investment under integration, ijv, satisfies
−Cji (qjv, ijv) = I 0(ijv), (19)
where qjv ≡ qj(ijv) denotes specialized inputs produced when B integrates with Sj .
Under domestic supply, equilibrium investment under integration is larger than the first-best,
idv(t) > idfb(t), for any positive tariﬀ, since the right-hand side of (19) is smaller than the right-hand
side of (7) when t > 0. The domestic integrated firm does not internalize the full social costs from
sub-optimal sourcing induced by the tariﬀ, so it overinvests unless there is free trade. By contrast,
investment under integration equals the first best under oﬀshore specialized supply, when the tariﬀ
does not distort sourcing decisions.
3 Protection and Welfare
We can now study the welfare impact of protectionist policies. In this section we still take orga-
nizational form as given, analyzing the eﬀect of tariﬀs in each of the four possible organization
structures. In the next section we look at how protection influences equilibrium organizational
forms.
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3.1 Domestic Outsourcing
Taking into account how Sd chooses investment as a function of the tariﬀ, we find the impact
of protection on national welfare under domestic outsourcing by diﬀerentiating W d(ida(t), t) with
respect to t:
dW d(ida(t), t)
dt
= t
dMda (t)
dt
− di
d
a(t)
dt
h
Cdi (q
d
a, i
d
a(t)) + I
0(ida(t))
i
= t
∙
dQ∗(t)
dt
− dq
d
a(t)
dt
¸
− di
d
a(t)
dt
h
Cdi (q
d
a, i
d
a(t)) + I
0(ida(t))
i
, (20)
where we have used equations (1) and (2) to simplify (20). For given investment, the tariﬀ inef-
ficiently reduces imports. The (negative) first term in the right-hand side of (20) represents this
distortion. On the other hand, a tariﬀ mitigates the ineﬃciency in investment decisions. Starting
from free trade, and for a given level of imports, more investment is socially beneficial whenever
α < 1, because Sd invests too little due to hold up (equation 14). A tariﬀ stimulates investment
unless α = 0 (Proposition 1). The second term in the right-hand side of (20) represents the social
gain from a marginal increase in investment, and is strictly positive unless α = 1 or α = 0. Because
of this eﬀect, for α ∈ (0, 1) national welfare is maximized at a strictly positive tariﬀ. Assuming for
expositional simplicity that W d is strictly concave, we denote this tariﬀ as tda.
Proposition 3 If the hold-up problem is insoluble (α = 0) or there is no hold-up problem (α = 1),
tda = 0. Otherwise, tda > 0.
To our knowledge, this motivation for protection is entirely novel in the literature.16 Here, all
standard motivations for protection are absent. Still, a tariﬀ can help by alleviating the supplier’s
underinvestment. The intuition for this result is very simple. With a tariﬀ, the supplier anticipates
earning rents from her investment on more sold units, so she increases her investment. Returning
to Figure 2, we see that this higher investment lowers Cdq , which further increases Sd’s supply, to
qda(t). As a result, national surplus increases by area c due to the supplier’s lower marginal cost
for the units she already produced. Because the supplier now produces more, national surplus
increases also by area d, which corresponds to savings relative to the country’s cost of imported
inputs, pw, on the extra units produced by Sd. In turn, national surplus falls by area e due to the
wedge that the tariﬀ drives between the private cost of foreign and domestic inputs. The tariﬀ also
causes the aggregate purchase of inputs, Q∗(t), to fall, producing the additional deadweight loss
shown in area g.17 The investment cost also increases, as investment rises from id(0) to id(t). Still,
for a suﬃciently small tariﬀ the social cost from ineﬃcient sourcing is of second order, whereas the
social net gain from the enhanced investment is of first order, warranting a strictly positive optimal
tariﬀ.
16The exception is the independent work of Antràs and Staiger (2008), who also study trade policy in the presence
of hold-up problems, but under a very diﬀerent model and with very diﬀerent aims.
17Area f , which under free trade is absorbed by B, now goes to the government in the form of tariﬀ revenue.
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Note however that, although tda > 0 whenever α ∈ (0, 1), this tariﬀ does not induce the first-best
level of investment.
Proposition 4 ida(tda) < idfb(t
d
a) for any non-extreme level of bargaining power.
The reason is that solving the hold-up problem brings its own distortions. The tariﬀ ineﬃciently
reduces B’s total purchases of inputs (area g in Figure 2) and promotes excessive domestic pro-
duction (area e). Both eﬀects work as "brakes" on how far protectionist policies can go in raising
welfare in the presence of domestic hold-up problems.18
3.2 Domestic Integration
When B and Sd are vertically integrated, there is no hold-up problem. The salutary eﬀect of the
tariﬀ vanishes and the welfare-maximizing policy is free trade. Diﬀerentiating W dv (i
j
v(t), t) with
respect to t, we find the marginal loss from protection:
dW d(idv(t), t)
dt
= t
∙
dQ∗(t)
dt
− dq
d
v(t)
dt
¸
≤ 0. (21)
Hence tdv = 0.
3.3 Oﬀshoring
Under oﬀshoring, a tariﬀ does not aﬀect investment under any ownership k. Thus, since all standard
motivations for active trade policy are absent, protection ineﬃciently lowers imports and does
nothing else. Diﬀerentiating W f (ifk , t) with respect to t, we have:
dW f (ifk , t)
dt
= t
dQ∗(t)
dt
≤ 0. (22)
Hence, tfa = t
f
v = 0. Figure 3 shows the deadweight loss from protection (area c).
3.4 The Impact of Protection under Diﬀerent Organizational Structures
The welfare-maximizing organizational form satisfies
Maxj∈{d,f},k∈{a,v}
n
U j(ijk(t), t) + tM
j
k(t)− 1[k = v]K
o
, (23)
where 1[•] denotes the indicator function. Our analysis makes clear that a tariﬀ can aﬀect the
solution of this problem. Some protection is desirable under domestic specialized outsourcing
18This trade-oﬀ arises because, in the tradition of the property rights literature (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986), we
distinguish investment from production decisions. In this context, tariﬀs boost ex ante investment only at the cost of
promoting excessive ex post domestic production. This trade-oﬀ does not arise in the setting of Antràs and Staiger
(2008), where there is a one-to-one correspondence between investment and production. Internationally eﬃcient trade
taxes fully solve the hold-up problem in their setting.
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but is harmful under the other types of organizations. We can also rank the (un)desirability of
protection in those cases. Specifically, by comparing expressions (20), (21) and (22), we have that,
for t ∈ (0, tda),
dW d(idv, t)
dt
<
dW f (ifv , t)
dt
=
dW f (ifa , t)
dt
< 0 <
dW d(ida, t)
dt
. (24)
The reason why protection is more harmful when B and Sd integrate than when B sources from
Sf is simple. A tariﬀ ineﬃciently lowers Q∗ by the same amount in all cases, but under domestic
supply it lowers imports further, by distorting sourcing toward Sd. Under arm’s-length trading this
additional ineﬃciency is more than compensated by the mitigation of the hold-up problem, but not
under integration. The following example illustrates these points.
3.5 An Example
Consider this quadratic specification: V (Q) = AQ− Q22 , Cj(q, i) = (C
j
0− i)q+
q2
2 , I(i) = i
2, with A
set large relative to {Cj0}. This yields linear "supply" (Cjq ) and "demand" (V 0) curves, with Cj0− ij
denoting the intercept of Sj ’s marginal cost curve. With this specification, it is straightforward to
find Q∗, {qjk}, {i
j
k} and t
d
a.
Consider then optimal organizational form. Under free trade, the foreign technology yields
higher investment, conditional on ownership k, if Cf0 < C
d
0 . In that case, W
f > W d. Integration
yields higher welfare than outsourcing if K is suﬃciently low. Figure 4 shows how the socially
optimal organizational form (i.e., the solution to (23)) varies with Cf0 and K. Domestic specialized
supply is optimal if Cf0 < C
d
0 , and integration is optimal when K is low. Conditional on C
f
0 < C
d
0 ,
the level of K such that foreign outsourcing yields higher welfare than foreign integration falls
with Cf0 .
19 For Cf0 > C
d
0 , domestic specialized supply is optimal and, for K ≥ K 0, outsourcing is
optimal.20
Now consider the case where there is a tariﬀ t ∈ (0, tda). Figure 5 shows optimal organization
forms in this case, including dashed lines that show the corresponding regions from Figure 4. The
tariﬀ enhances the social surplus under domestic outsourcing relative to each other organizational
form. Domestic outsourcing is now preferred to foreign outsourcing and foreign integration for
some parameter values such that Sd’s fundamental technology is worse than Sf ’s (i.e., in the range
Cf0 ∈ [Cd0 − δ,Cd0 ], 0 < δ < t). Intuitively, the tariﬀ improves Sf ’s investment incentives to the
point that its post-investment marginal cost curve is lower than Sf ’s post-investment marginal cost
curve (not including the tariﬀ).21 In essence, the tariﬀ gives Sd a productivity advantage.
19The maximum K under which vertical integration is optimal (conditional on oﬀshoring) declines with Cf0 because,
as Cf0 increases, q
f falls for given level of investment, lowering the return of investment. This makes the hold-up
problem less severe, reducing the gains from vertical integration.
20The level of Cd0 also aﬀects the cutoﬀ value of K, but since Cd0 is fixed in Figure 4, the cutoﬀ is represented by a
horizontal line (as it does not depend on Cf0 in this region).
21This is most easily seen by considering the limiting case where Cf0 approaches C
d
0 . With no tariﬀ, Sd has the
same investment incentives as Sf . With a positive tariﬀ, Sd invests more than Sf , so its marginal-cost curve shifts
down more.
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Figure 4: Socially Optimal Organizational Forms under Free Trade
Domestic outsourcing is also preferred to domestic integration in a range K ∈ [K 0 − ∆,K 0],
∆ > 0, in contrast to the situation under free trade. Finally, conditional on integration, the tariﬀ
tilts socially optimal supply toward oﬀshoring, consistent with (24). In Figure 5, this happens for
Cf0 ∈ [Cd0 , Cd0 + ε], ε > 0.
4 Organizational Structure
We now study the choice of organizational form. We allow the buyer to choose between Sd and
Sf and to decide whether to integrate. Under arm’s-length trading, if B adapts toward Sd, he
requires a transfer of uds(ida, t), since he knows that Sd has no alternative better than producing
the numéraire good. The supplier is willing to pay up to her total profit within the relationship,
so the buyer’s payoﬀ is Ud(ida, t). Analogously, if B adapts toward Sf , he obtains a total payoﬀ of
Uf (ifa , t). The buyer’s payoﬀ is given by U j(i
j
v, t) if he integrates with Sj .
The firms’ organizational form problem is
Maxj∈{d,f},k∈{a,v}
n
U j(ijk(t), t)− 1[k = v]K
o
. (25)
This maximization problem is identical to (23) under free trade (t = 0), in which case the equi-
librium organizational form is eﬃcient. But when tariﬀs are positive, there are organizational
externalities. Since tariﬀ revenue is not captured by the firms, when it is diﬀerent across organiza-
tional forms it may distort the firms’ choice away from the welfare-maximizing one. The distortions
arise in the supplier and in the ownership decisions.
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Figure 5: Socially Optimal Organizational Forms under Protection
For ease of exposition, consider first the ownership decision, conditional on specialized supplier
Sj ’s being chosen. Assuming B chooses integration when the payoﬀs are the same, the firms
integrate if and only if
∆U j ≡ U j(ijv(t), t)− U j(ija(t), t) ≥ K, (26)
that is, if the private gains to integration, ∆U j , exceed the integration fixed cost. By contrast,
integration maximizes national surplus if and only if
∆W j ≡ U j(ijv(t), t)− U j(ija(t), t)− t
£
M ja(t)−M jv (t)
¤
≥ K, (27)
that is, if the social gains to integration, ∆W j , exceed the integration fixed cost.
Since tariﬀs do not aﬀect investment under oﬀshoring (j = f), the social gains to integration
do not depend on the tariﬀ. Furthermore, tariﬀ revenue does not depend on whether integration
is chosen in this case,22 because all inputs are imported regardless [Mfa (t) = M
f
v (t) = Q∗(t)]. The
private gains to integration equal the social gains. Therefore, tariﬀs do not distort the integration
decision when the specialized supplier is foreign.
On the other hand, integration does aﬀect tariﬀ revenue under onshoring (j = d). Since the
number of specialized inputs sold is greater, imports and tariﬀ revenue are lower under integration
than under outsourcing [Mda (t) = Q∗(t)− qda(t) > Q∗(t)− qdv(t) = Mdv (t)]. Hence, when tariﬀs are
22This statement, and its implications, relies on the tariﬀ being specific. When the tariﬀ is ad valorem, the
ineﬃciency of the ownership decision under onshoring observed below extends to oﬀshore specialized supply. We
show this in the section 5.
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positive, the private gains to integrating exceed the social gains.
Proposition 5 Under free trade, the equilibrium ownership decision is socially eﬃcient. For any
t > 0, if the firms choose outsourcing over integration, it is the socially eﬃcient ownership structure.
If the firms integrate, it is socially eﬃcient if Sf is selected but may be ineﬃcient if Sd is chosen.
Consider next the supply decision, conditional on ownership k being chosen. Assuming B
chooses Sd when the payoﬀs are the same, B specializes toward Sd if and only if
Ud(idk(t), t)− Uf (i
f
k , t) ≥ 0. (28)
Again, the supplier decision need not be socially optimal because it disregards tariﬀ revenue. For
t > 0, imports and tariﬀ proceeds are lower under onshore specialized supply because tariﬀs are
paid on generic inputs only: Mfk (t) > M
d
k (t) for any k. As a result, the diﬀerence between firm B’s
total payoﬀ and Home’s national welfare is smaller under onshoring than under oﬀshoring.
Proposition 6 Under free trade, the equilibrium supply decision is socially eﬃcient. For any
t > 0, if Sf is chosen, it is the socially eﬃcient supplier. If Sd is chosen, it may be ineﬃcient
under either outsourcing or integration.
4.1 An Example, continued
Using the example described in subsection 3.5, we now consider equilibrium organizational form
(i.e., the solution to (25)). Under free trade, the equilibrium organizational form is socially eﬃcient.
Due to propositions 5 and 6, onshore supply may be privately optimal but socially ineﬃcient under
protection, because the firms neglect the lost tariﬀ revenue under domestic supply. This distortion
is highlighted by the light gray region in Figure 6. Domestic outsourcing (when K is suﬃciently
high) is chosen for Cf0 > C
d
0 − t because the renegotiation surplus is higher and Sd chooses a higher
investment.23 However, domestic outsourcing is socially ineﬃcient for Cf0 < C
d
0 − δ, because Sd
produces at a higher marginal cost than Sf (not including the tariﬀ). Intuitively, welfare is higher
if B chooses Sf and the Home country captures some tariﬀ revenue on specialized inputs. Because
B does not get that tariﬀ revenue, he chooses Sd.
In turn, domestic integration (whenK is suﬃciently low) is chosen for Cf0 > C
d
0−t but is socially
ineﬃcient (relative to foreign integration) for Cf0 < C
d
0 + ε. This distortion is represented by the
dark gray region in Figure 6. Domestic outsourcing is ineﬃcient for a smaller range than domestic
integration because of the salutary eﬀect of the tariﬀ on investment under domestic outsourcing.
Tariﬀs also distort the integration decision in cases where Sd is chosen. This is highlighted by
the dark gray area for intermediate levels of K. Since tariﬀ revenue is lower under integration and
23The easiest way to see this is to note that, if Cf0 = C
d
0 − t, the renegotiation surplus is the same under foreign
and domestic outsourcing. Hence, investments by Sf and Sd are the same. As Cf0 increases, the renegotiation surplus
under foreign outsourcing shrinks, so she invests less.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Organizational Forms under Protection
the firms do not factor this into their integration decision, they integrate for values of K that are
too high from a social welfare standpoint.24
4.2 Trade Liberalization
Our paper shows that the nature of distortions caused by tariﬀs may be far more subtle than
normally believed. Because tariﬀs may simultaneously encourage welfare-enhancing investments
and welfare-detracting organizational choices, assessing the magnitude and direction of welfare
changes due to changes in tariﬀs requires careful consideration of substitution between domestic
and foreign inputs and between organizational forms. To highlight this, consider what propositions
5 and 6 imply for changes in trade flows, organizational structures and welfare resulting from trade
liberalization.
24Note, however, that the dark gray area need not go beyond K’, as it does in this example. That is, it is possible
that some protection will prompt (welfare-maximizing) domestic outsourcing. The reason is that the private gains
to integrating, conditional on domestic specialized supply, may either increase or decrease with tariﬀs. This result
mirrors a finding by Ornelas and Turner (2008). As the tariﬀ rises, Sd increases her investment under outsourcing.
This lowers the gain from eliminating the hold-up problem, since this extra investment has a first-order positive
eﬀect on the firms’ joint surplus under arm’s length, when investment is ineﬃciently low, but not under vertical
integration, when investment is chosen to maximize the firms’ joint surplus. This mitigation of the hold-up problem
lowers the private gains from integration when the tariﬀ rises. Now, since an increase in the tariﬀ makes imports more
expensive, it lowers the joint surplus of the firms, but does so more prominently when they trade under arm’s length,
and imports levels are higher. Because of this volume of trade eﬀect, ∆Ud increases when the tariﬀ rises. In general,
either of these two eﬀects can dominate, implying that, conditional on onshore specialized sourcing, protection can
induce either vertical integration or outsourcing.
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Naturally, any model would indicate that, as tariﬀs fall, we should observe more oﬀshoring rel-
ative to onshoring, increasing international trade flows. But our model suggests that this increase
can be highly non-linear and disproportionately higher than the tariﬀ changes because of organiza-
tional restructuring. This can help to explain the observed puzzling large response of trade flows to
tariﬀs stressed for example by Yi (2003).25 Furthermore, our model indicates that discrete jumps
in trade flows due to organizational changes set oﬀ by falling tariﬀs do not require a change from
domestic to foreign specialized partners. If trade liberalization prompts domestic ‘disintegration’
(in our example, this would happen if K were not much larger than K’ and Cd0 < C
f
0 ), there would
be a jump in the purchases of imported generic inputs even though the specialized supplier remains
domestic.
Our analysis also implies that the welfare impact of trade liberalization is qualitatively diﬀerent
from what conventional models suggest. Organizational structure notwithstanding, welfare rises
as tariﬀs fall due to the regular mechanism of increasing imports. But trade liberalization can
also trigger organizational change. If organization structure under protection is {k, j} 6= {d, a} but
changes because of trade liberalization, then this would be evidence that tariﬀ revenue externalities
eﬀectively distorted organizational choice under protection. Accordingly, the move to free trade
would generate additional welfare gains due to the removal of these externalities.
The exception is when the organizational structure under protection is {d, a}. In that case,
welfare gains from trade liberalization are not warranted. The reason is the loss of the productivity
advantage brought about by the tariﬀ. If {d, a} remains the firms’ choice under free trade–and
the original tariﬀ were not higher than tda–the move to free trade necessarily implies a net welfare
loss due to the consequent aggravation of the hold-up problem. If organization form changes as
the tariﬀ falls, welfare could go either up or down. In our example, it would go down if K were
suﬃciently high and Cf0 ∈ [Cd0 − δ, Cd0 ], in which case the choice of organization would be eﬃcient
regardless of the tariﬀ, but the productivity advantage introduced by the tariﬀ would be lost under
free trade.
The following corollary summarizes this discussion.
Corollary 1 As the tariﬀ falls from t < tda to zero:
a) welfare falls if both the initial and the final organizational structure is {d, a};
b) welfare rises when the initial organizational structure is {k, j} 6= {d, a}, especially if an
organizational change is triggered;
c) welfare can either increase or decrease if the initial organizational structure is {d, a} and the
fall in the tariﬀ triggers a change.
5 Ad valorem tariﬀs
For simplicity, we have so far considered the case of specific import tariﬀs. As we show in this
section, our results are broadly equivalent when the import tariﬀ is ad valorem–although some
25We make a similar point in Ornelas and Turner (2008).
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qualifications are warranted.
To see that, denote the ad valorem tariﬀ by τ and consider first the case of domestic outsourcing.
Privately eﬃcient sourcing requires now that
Cdq (q
d, i) = pw(1 + τ). (29)
As before, u1ds − u0s = pdqd − Cd(qd, i), whereas now u1db − u0b = qd
£
(1 + τ)pw − pd)
¤
. Thus, the
surplus from negotiation for the two parties becomes NSd = (1 + τ)pwqd − Cd(qd, i). Using (29),
it is then straightforward to see that S’s choice of investment is again given by (14), which is the
basis of propositions 1, 3 and 4.
The analysis is slightly more involved when B oﬀshores specialized inputs at arm’s length. The
reason is that, with an ad valorem tariﬀ, the division of surplus between B and Sf also aﬀects their
total gains from negotiating: while a lower pf increases the firms’ joint surplus–because it induces
lower tariﬀ payments on specialized components–it also reduces Sf ’s share of the surplus. As a
result, splitting NSf according to bargaining power is no longer equivalent to the generalized Nash
bargaining solution.
Yet noticing that u1fb − u0b = (pw − pf )(1 + τ)qf , maximization of³
u1fs − u0s
´α ³
u1fb − u
0
b
´1−α
with respect to qf and pf still gives us the same solution as before: Cfq (qf , i) = pw as the privately
eﬃcient sourcing condition and negotiation price epf = αpw+(1−α)Cf (qf , i)/qf . We are then back
to (18), which is the basis of Proposition 2.
The possible drawback to this result is the incentive of the two parties to underreport their
negotiation price, epf , as a way to lower tariﬀ payments. If customs authorities can eﬀectively
prevent the firms from such misrepresentation of their actual trading price, our results would
remain unaltered.
It is easy to see that, if firms B and Sj are vertically integrated, all of our results under a specific
tariﬀ carry through under an ad valorem tariﬀ as well. Again, the only issue regards the incentive
of firms to manipulate their transfer prices to reduce duty payments. As in the large literature
on multinational firms–with the exception of those concerned specifically with transfer pricing–
we sidestep this issue by considering (as it appears to be the case at least in the most developed
countries) that custom authorities are able to satisfactorily limit transfer price manipulation.
Now, with respect to organizational choice, there is a qualitative diﬀerence when the tariﬀ is
ad valorem, rather than specific. It arises in the integration decision when the specialized supplier
is abroad. The reason is that, unlike the situation with specific tariﬀs, now tariﬀ revenue depends
on the mix of generic/customized inputs, since they command diﬀerent prices. Specifically (and
assuming transfer price manipulation issues do not arise, so that B and Sf trade at epf regardless
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of integration), vertical integration is socially optimal in this case if and only if
∆W f ≡ Uf (ifv (t), t)− Uf (ifa(t), t)− (1 + τ)[(pw − epf )(qdv(t)− qda(t))] ≥ K. (30)
Since the expression in square brackets is strictly positive, a situation where ∆Uf ≥ K > ∆W f is
possible, in which case B and Sf integrate when it is socially ineﬃcient. Hence, with ad valorem
tariﬀs there is a bias toward too much integration also under oﬀshoring.26
Since the integration decision under onshoring is just as before, the analog of Proposition 5
under an ad valorem tariﬀ is as follows.
Proposition 7 Let any tariﬀ be assessed on an ad valorem basis. Under free trade, the equilib-
rium ownership decision is socially eﬃcient. For any t > 0, if the firms choose outsourcing over
integration, it is the socially eﬃcient ownership. If the firms integrate, it may be socially ineﬃcient
under either onshoring or oﬀshoring.
On the other hand, the (in)eﬃciency of the supply decision is not fundamentally altered by the
type of tariﬀs in use. Accordingly, Proposition 6 holds just as before.
6 Conclusion
Economists have long known that tariﬀs distort resource allocation by driving a wedge between the
cost of imports and the cost of domestic alternatives. We show that the nature of these distortions
can be far more subtle than standard trade theory implies.
First, tariﬀ distortions can improve overall welfare if they help to economize on transactions
costs stemming from incomplete contracts. In this sense, our analysis oﬀers a lesson that applies
regardless of how governments set trade policies. If protectionist policies are in place, motivated
by reasons other than economic eﬃciency (e.g. politics), our results imply that they are likely
to be less harmful (and perhaps even beneficial) from a social standpoint than current theories
suggest–if applied on sectors where asset specificity and incomplete contracts are important, and
outsourcing is mainly from domestic firms.
Second, protection distorts organizational decisions. Government intervention drives a wedge
between the private and the social value to domestic sourcing and to vertical integration. As a
result, firms may ineﬃciently outsource domestically or have ineﬃciently large boundaries under
protection. By contrast, free trade induces firms to choose the "right" organizational form.
Our model allows us to uncover these novel implications of protectionist policies in a strikingly
simple way. But inevitably, and as in most incomplete-contracts models, this requires some restric-
tions on the industrial organization of the buyer and suppliers. Relaxing those restrictions would
aﬀect some results. For example, if the downstream firm has market power in final-good sales, trade
26 If firms were more able to engage in transfer price manipulations when they are integrated than when they trade
at arm’s length, as it is likely to be the case, the size of the square bracket in (30) would be even larger. This would
reinforce the bias toward too much integration.
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policy will aﬀect both hold-up problems and final-good distortions. Hence, industry concentration
could aﬀect the extent to which diﬀerentiated-input product markets benefit or suﬀer from tariﬀs.
Additionally, if the downstream firm could simultaneously source from both foreign and domestic
specialized suppliers, tariﬀs would worsen hold-up problems with foreign suppliers. In that case,
the welfare eﬀects of a domestic tariﬀ would depend on the relative productivities of the suppliers.
Still, it is clear that our main insights about how discriminatory policies aﬀect the severity of
hold-up problems and about how protection distorts organization decisions are not an artifact of our
stylized environment. In fact, as we point out throughout the text, relaxing our main simplifying
assumptions (allowing single sourcing, banning lump sum transfers between the firms, permitting
trade taxes on final goods, introducing ad valorem tariﬀs) would have no impact on our fundamental
findings. On the other hand, the parsimony of the model makes it amenable to several promising
extensions, as we discuss below.
We identify welfare-maximizing tariﬀs for given organizational form, but do not characterize
optimal trade policy when organizational form is endogenous. Acknowledging the endogeneity of
organizational form is nevertheless central if one wants to study optimal trade policy, as a govern-
ment must recognize that a tariﬀ may prompt ineﬃcient organizations. This can be challenging.
For example, under domestic specialized supply, optimal tariﬀs are positive under outsourcing, but
they can trigger ineﬃcient vertical integration. Hence, if integration is privately preferred under
protection, the first-best combination of organizational form and trade policy may be impossible
to achieve.
We consider that the Home country is small in world markets, unable to aﬀect the world price
of generic inputs. That assumption allows us to focus on the new implications of protection that
we identify. But considering the case where Home is "large" could prove interesting, especially
when specialized outsourcing is mainly domestic. In that case, a tariﬀ would lower the world
price of generic inputs, and this would reduce the tariﬀ’s impact on the outside option of the
buyer. As a result, the hold-up problem would not be helped as much. Thus, to mitigate hold-up
problems to a certain extent, the government would have to raise the tariﬀ by more than the current
analysis suggests, with the resulting lower world price hurting the exporters of generic inputs. This
would suggest a greater need for international trade agreements than the standard view proposes
(e.g. Bagwell and Staiger 1999), as a large country would seek to aﬀect world prices not only to
extract surplus from trade partners, but also to curb purely domestic ineﬃciencies. By relaxing the
assumption that the buyer can make ex ante take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, our framework would also
permit the study of the role of trade agreements in overcoming organizational externalities.
One could extend our environment to study also preferential trade agreements, such as free
trade areas (FTAs). Due to its discriminatory nature, an FTA could be particularly helpful in at-
tenuating hold-up problems and raising welfare among countries that share a significant number of
cross-border vertically related (but independent) firms. Intuitively, by favoring "inside" options rel-
ative to "outside" options, the FTA would yield eﬃciency-enhancing trade diversion. Intriguingly,
multilateral liberalization would not help hold-up problems in this case, because it would remove
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the possibility of discriminatory tariﬀs. In this sense, regionalism could provide a benign alternative
to multilateralism, helping to justify–although with an entirely diﬀerent reasoning–the "natural
trading partners" rationale for preferential liberalization (see e.g. Frankel 1997).
We do not explore varying levels of contract enforcement across countries either. This is poten-
tially important. As Antràs and Helpman (2008) show, diﬀerent levels of input contractibility can
aﬀect organizational form. Indeed, Nunn (2007) presents empirical evidence that the strength of
contract enforcement helps to explain patterns of international trade in goods with diﬀerentiated
intermediate inputs. Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2008) show further that the interac-
tion between product contractability and national levels of contract enforcement helps to explain
diﬀerent levels of intra-firm trade. Our framework oﬀers the possibility to study whether contract
enforcement and tariﬀs are strategic complements or substitutes, a topic that has received little
attention.27 Intuitively, stronger contracts would weaken hold-up problems and the need for in-
tegration, favoring arm’s-length trade and free trade. However, as we show, tariﬀs are useless if
parties cannot enforce contracts and hold-up problems are extreme. As the strength of contract
enforcement increases, this could enhance the role of tariﬀs in promoting relationship-specific in-
vestments. The eﬃcacy of tariﬀs will, however, depend crucially on how damage remedies influence
the way parties deal with contract breach.28 We look forward to further progress in these areas.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If α = 0, it follows directly from (13) that investment is worthless for
Sd, and therefore ida = 0. Otherwise, ida > 0 because I 0(0) = 0, and satisfies (14). As α rises, the
convexity of Γ ensures that ida increases. Investment also increases with the tariﬀ whenever α > 0:
dida
dt
=
αCdqi/C
d
qq
SONCd
> 0, (31)
where we use the fact that ∂qd/∂t = 1/Cdqq, which follows from the definition of qd in (2), and
where SONCd is defined in footnote 6.
Finally, from the first-order conditions that define idfb and i
d
a (equations 7 and 14, respectively),
it follows that ida < idfb if and only if
−αCdi < −Cdi − t
dqd
di
= −Cdi +
Cdiq
Cdqq
t,
27To our knowledge, Diez (2008) is the only empirical attempt at testing the impact of tariﬀs on organizational
choices.
28For example, starting with Shavell (1980), several studies have shown that the "expectation damages" remedy
produces outcomes diﬀerent than the "reliance damages" remedy. This literature also shows that assumptions about
renegotiation and the costliness of disputes are crucial.
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or equivalently iﬀ
t <
(1− α)Cdi Cdqq
Cdiq
.
Since the right-hand side is finite and non-negative, this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of the statements in the first two sentences of the proposition
is entirely analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. To see that ifa is independent of the tariﬀ, notice
that, by (3), qf is unaﬀected by the tariﬀ. It then follows from (18) that ifa is also unaﬀected by
the tariﬀ.
Proof of Proposition 3. Using (14), we can write the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the tariﬀ
on national welfare as
dW d(ida(t), t)
dt
= t
dMda (t)
dt
− di
d
a(t)
dt
(1− α)Cdi (qda, ida(t)). (32)
Suppose that α ∈ (0, 1). Then, the second term of (32) is strictly positive, because di
d
a
dt > 0 and
Cdi < 0. Hence,
dWd
dt > 0 if the first term is non-negative. Since
dMda (t)
dt < 0, that term is nonnegative
for any t ≤ 0. Thus it cannot be true that tda ≤ 0. Hence tda > 0.
Next suppose that α = 0. By Proposition 1, di
d
a(t)
dt = 0, so (32) collapses to t
dMda (t)
dt . Since
dMda (t)
dt < 0, sgn(32) = sgn(t). Hence t
d
a = 0. If α = 1, the second term of (32) vanishes and once
again dW
d(ida(t,0),t)
dt = t
dMda (t)
dt . The same logic follows.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that ida(tda) < idfb if and only
if tda <
(1−α)Cdi Cdqq
Cdiq
. Equating (20) to zero and developing it, one finds
tda =
α(1− α)Cdi CdiqV 00
CdqqSONCd + V 00
¡
αCdii + I 00
¢ .
Thus, if α < 1, tda <
(1−α)Cdi Cdqq
Cdiq
and ida(td) < idfb if and only if
α(1− α)Cdi CdiqV 00
CdqqSONCd + V 00
¡
αCdii + I 00
¢ < (1− α)Cdi Cdqq
Cdiq
⇐⇒
α
³
Cdiq
´2
V 00
Cdqq
> CdqqSONC
d + V 00
³
αCdii + I
00
´
⇐⇒ V 00
⎡
⎢⎣α
⎛
⎜⎝
³
Cdiq
´2
Cdqq
− Cdii
⎞
⎟⎠− I 00
⎤
⎥⎦ > CdqqSONCd
⇐⇒ V 00 < Cdqq,
which is always true.
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Proof of Proposition 5. If t = 0, there is no diﬀerence between the private and social gains to
vertical integration, given by expressions (26) and (27) respectively, so the equilibrium ownership
decision is clearly eﬃcient.
Now, while the right-hand sides of (26) and (27) are identical, the left-hand side of (26) is greater
than the left-hand side of (27) whenever M ja(t) > M
j
v (t). Under oﬀshore supply, Mfv (t) = Mfa (t)
because all inputs are imported regardless of whether the firms integrate. Hence, there is no
diﬀerence between (26) and (27) in that case. Under onshore supply, idv > ida implies Cdq (idv) <
Cdq (ida), which in turn implies Mda (t) > Mdv (t). Hence, if condition (27) is satisfied, condition (26)
is satisfied as well for any t ≥ 0. On the other hand, if t > 0 there could be situations where
Ud(idv(t), t)− Ud(ida(t), t) ≥ K > Ud(idv(t), t)− Ud(ida(t), t)− t
h
Mda (t)−Mdv (t)
i
,
in which case B and Sd integrate even though vertical integration is not socially optimal.
Proof of Proposition 6. If t = 0, there is no diﬀerence between private and social gains to
oﬀshoring, so the equilibrium supply decision is clearly eﬃcient. For any tariﬀ t ≥ 0, B chooses
the domestic supplier if inequality (28) holds, whereas national surplus is higher under domestic
specialized sourcing if
Ud(idk(t), t)− Uf (i
f
k , t)− t
h
Mfk (t)−M
d
k (t)
i
≥ 0. (33)
The right-hand sides of (33) and (28) are both zero, but the left-hand side of (33) is smaller than
the left-hand side of (28), since imports are obviously higher when B sources specialized inputs
from the foreign supplier. Hence, if condition (33) is satisfied, condition (28) is satisfied as well for
any t ≥ 0. On the other hand, if t > 0 there could be situations where
Ud(idk(t), t)− Uf (i
f
k , t) ≥ 0 > U
d(idk(t), t)− Uf (i
f
k , t)− t
h
Mfk (t)−M
d
k (t)
i
,
in which case B sources domestically even though oﬀshoring would be socially optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1. Part a) follows from (24). Part b) follows from (24) and propositions
5 and 6. If foreign supply is initially chosen, the tariﬀ does not aﬀect the integration decision.
Since a fall in the tariﬀ makes foreign supply more appealing, no organizational change will occur.
By (24), welfare rises as the tariﬀ falls. If domestic integration is initially chosen, then a change
in suppliers due to falling tariﬀs is clearly eﬃciency enhancing by Proposition 5. If a drop in the
tariﬀ leads to domestic outsourcing, then it is also eﬃciency enhancing by Proposition 5. Part c)
is shown by noting that, on one hand, a falling tariﬀ lowers social welfare conditional on domestic
outsourcing by (24). However, a change from domestic outsourcing to foreign outsourcing would,
in and of itself, enhance eﬃciency by Proposition 6. Hence, welfare could either rise or fall as the
tariﬀ falls.
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